Fence off the parties, and start in the states

Both the Arizona GOP and the Nevada Democrats have seen what happens when ideologues take over the building.

Discussions about political parties lack talk about boundaries. What is the core of a political party? And why should we care? Julia Azari and others are right about the weakness and hollowness of U.S. parties. And that is primarily because parties are too permeable. Without strong boundaries, when practically anyone can join a group, leadership remains weakly rooted. This yields organizational drift, factional chaos, and underinvestment.

The problem of weak boundaries is most dire at the state level, precisely where strong  parties might contribute the most to democratic vitality. Strong state parties, for example, might provide a check against the increasing power of the partisan presidency. They might cultivate a state party system that does not simply reflect national tides of partisanship.

But state parties are way too porous. This enabled Tea Party insurgents to overrun party nomination conventions and permitted President Trump to purge many state party chairs. (There was a time, not long ago, when state party chairs leveraged power against presidents). The GOP has recently experienced wounding factional standoffs in Michigan and Arizona. The Nevada Democratic Party, an effective electoral organization built by Harry Reid, stumbled badly when a progressive faction, backed by the Democratic Socialists of America, won control of the party apparatus before again being ousted. The point I’m making is less about ideology than about the relative ease with which an entire state leadership structure can be swept out from one election to the next.

And here is my j’accuse moment. Donors, consultants, reformers. None of these influential groups – with rare individual exceptions – gives a damn about building strong state party organizations. Major donors focus nationally, with most dumping money into Super PACs. They see state parties as bad investments with uncertain leadership. 

For political consultants, weak parties are good for business. A weak party committee serves merely as a clearinghouse for finding candidate clients, tapping into major donor networks, and getting voter data,  rather than an entity where one can make a career.

As for progressive reformers, the case against their anti-partyism has been narrated so frequently I don’t have to repeat it. Reforms have chipped away at party boundaries and deepened the problems of collective action. I’m looking at you, McGovern-Fraser Commission and McCain-Feingold Act.

Read the whole series: Partisans without parties.

We political scientists like political parties, but we are not off the hook. Our stylized concepts may blind us to what ails parties. Many argue that the networked structure constitutes the party, without thinking about the consequences of informal arrangements on the ability to coordinate policies and win elections. With some exceptions, we have failed to appreciate the importance of the formal party organization. There is no there, there. Sam Rosenfeld and Danny Schlozman properly call it the party blob – an amorphous collection of partisan figures and groups. Informal coordination is sometimes workable, but hierarchies frequently matter for decisive collective action. 

The transition from Biden to Harris demonstrated strength in the Democratic Party. But don’t take it too far. Like death, the possibility of a Trump presidency concentrated the minds of different elements of the Democratic Party. Much of the party network yearned for Biden to step away, but ultimately a hierarchy was able to execute the decision many sought. A once-in-a-lifetime power broker, Nancy Pelosi marshaled the coalition. She benefited from having a president willing to cede his partisan power to claim the nomination. Imagine a similar scenario in the Democratic Party with personalities more like Kevin McCarthy and Donald Trump. 

The party must have the capacity to coordinate constituencies rather than be toppled by them.

Yes, boundaries. We need to think about them more. That would mean developing state parties that pay people well to attract talent and build careers. Raising a lot of money to pay professionals. Having governance structures and internal voting practices that make it harder for activists to swamp party elections with one-time attendees in a takeover bid. The influence of activists, primary voters, and donors is always going to be powerful. But the organization needs to defend itself and the long-term interests of the party. It must have the capacity to coordinate constituencies rather than be toppled by them.

I’ve recommended the deregulation of party finance, which some colleagues believe is realism run amok. They see the party turning into a mere bank account in this scenario. But I see financially stable state parties as a starting point for attracting talent, for being an effective coordinator of political activity, and for creating boundaries to challenge illiberal insurgents. I also believe financially well-off state parties, with good leadership, will subsidize local parties for grassroots work and social linkages in communities that give parties depth rather than hollowness.

Someone should look closely at the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL). Wow — it is hard to think of a more successful party. It has won every statewide election since 2011 and battled competitive House and Senate contests to get four years of a trifecta during this time. It has healthy finances and an engaged grassroots. I see boundaries. One telling feature is that the chair, Ken Martin, has held his position throughout this period of success — an unusually lengthy tenure. 

If Democrats take the White House, President Harris might task Vice President Walz to help take the Minnesota model nationwide. But that would require pushback against issue activists and consultants who benefit from weak state parties. It would also mean educating the donor class to make the kind of investments in party-building that would bring about success 10 years down the road. But that will only happen if party organizations put in place strong enough boundaries to withstand the tumult of factional feuds and insurgencies that derail professionalism and coalition-building.  

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Ray La Raja is Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and co-director of the UMass Amherst Poll. He has co-authored the books Hometown Inequality: Race, Class, and Representation in American Local Politics and Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail.

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